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Abstract 
The stance of Australia’s central authorities with respect to residential mortgage innovation 
appears different from many of our international counterparts.   In this article we provide an 
interpretation of this policy stance, concluding that signals are arguably a more prominent feature 
of Australia’s policy environment than many of our overseas counterparts.  In addition we also 
observe that whilst there is a strong link between innovation and (de)regulation, a healthy degree 
of competition appears to be necessary if a wider-set of consumers are to have access to these 
innovations. 
 
Introduction 
The overall effect of mortgage product innovation has been hotly debated in recent times.1  In 
some quarters it is seen as to have encouraged risky lending practices exposing economies to 
unacceptable levels of aggregate risk.  A number of central authorities in the wake of the 
financial crisis have subsequently intervened in the residential mortgage market limiting the 
products available (for example Singapore and New Zealand2). Fears of impending house price 
bubbles and public concerns about cavalier lending practices have been cited to justify these 
interventions.  In a recent report it was stated that 25 economies have experienced similar 
centrally administered interventions otherwise known as macro-prudential policy measures 
(IMF, 2011).  
                                                          
1See for example the US Government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/content-
detail.html accessed 10/7/2013 
2
 http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/resource/news_room/press_releases/2013/Annex%20II.pdf ; 
http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/financial_stability/macro-prudential_policy/5393159.html ; Accessed 16th April 2014 
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The approach Australian regulatory bodies have adopted seems to be different.  Consider an 
extract of a recent speech3 by APRA’s Chairman, Wayne Byrne, in his appearance before a 
senate committee: 
“First, within our regulatory framework APRA generally seeks to avoid outright 
prohibitions on activities where possible: instead, our regulatory philosophy is to focus 
on institutions’ setting their own appetite for risk.” 
This approach has remained despite the loud and regular commentary that residential properties 
in Australian capital cities are some of the most expensive in the world (see for example 
Demographia, 2014).  
Recent Australian economic experience in the residential housing market differs from many of 
its international counterparts.  In particular, there has been no significant house price correction 
or acceleration, at least not on the scale of countries like the US and Ireland.  This leads us to 
ask: why is Australia different?  Answers to this question are many and varied. They include 
reference to the institutional and legislative structure and particular features of Australia’s 
various housing markets.4 This article presents a review of some of the major mortgage market 
innovations to illustrate one dimension of this story; the (de)regulation–innovation  nexus. 
 
Australian Prudential Management 
Before we identify the (de)regulation–innovation nexus it is important to observe that Australian 
regulators have not been lax in their approach to managing aggregate risk. For example, the RBA 
through its many vehicles has been very active in signaling to the market to curb any “risky 
lending behavior”.5 Further, although macroprudential laws forbidding particular loan features, 
high loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, for example have not been passed, significant changes by 
APRA to the National Consumer Credit Protection (NCCP) legislation have been made 
curtailing the lending behavior of mortgage originators.   
The Australian approach is typified by the following quote by Philip Lowe, Deputy Governor of 
the RBA in a recent speech6 where he discussed aggregate risk:  
“It is also important to point out that the fact that the Bank and APRA are talking about 
these issues does not mean that a return to the type of heavy regulation we saw in earlier 
decades is on the agenda. That earlier experience demonstrated all too clearly the 
distorting effects of such regulation as well as the ability of financial institutions to 
                                                          
3http://www.apra.gov.au/Speeches/Pages/Opening%20statement%20to%20the%20Senate%20Standing%20Committ
ee%20on%20Economics%20October%202014.aspx  Accessed 22nd October 2014 
4See the following speech for example  http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/fsr/2014/mar/pdf/0314.pdf, page 2. 
5The following speech is just one example of the active signalling campaign the RBA has been engaged in.  
http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2012/sp-so-230212.html  Accessed June 6th 2014 
6
 http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-ag-300310.html#f1  (accessed October 22nd 2014) 
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circumvent it, including by activities outside the regulatory net. As it turns out, the 
financial system is very good at finding ways of getting money from the people who have 
it to those who want to borrow it, although perhaps less good at containing aggregate 
risk. All this means that we need to be realistic about what can be achieved through 
changes in the regulatory parameters alone. This realism, however, need not preclude 
consideration of modest and sensible changes within the existing prudential framework.” 
Importantly, we also observe that the policy makers in Australia have not been concerned with 
“innovation” per se – rather “risky lending behaviour” which is sometimes manifested in the 
form of innovations.  Guy Debelle’s (Assistant Governor (Financial Markets) RBA) address7 to a 
Mortgage innovation conference highlights this distinction: 
“Through the late 1990s and first half of the 2000s, there was considerable product 
innovation in the Australian mortgage market. Lenders sought to cater for a wider range 
of potential borrowers and found new ways to assess their borrowing capacity. Some of 
this innovation has resulted in an easing in lending standards and an increase in risk for 
both borrowers and lenders, but its overwhelming effect has been to widen the range of 
households who can access finance. Moreover, when the lending was more risky, lenders 
charged a larger spread on these loans to take account of the greater risk and required 
lower loan to valuation ratios (LVRs) for these loans.” 
 
The degree to which these concepts (aggregate risk and mortgage product innovation) are 
distinguished is fundamentally important.  In contrast to many international counterparts the 
policy stance of Australian authorities seems to be that they accept there is some association 
between the two as well as a limit to the effectiveness of regulation. 
Recognising the limitation of regulations is neither a recent nor Australian-centric phenomenon: 
“As financial systems become more complex, detailed rules and standards have become 
more burdensome and ineffective, if not counterproductive. If we wish to foster financial 
innovation, we must be careful not to impose rules that will inhibit it.” Greenspan (p48, 
1997)  
The Australian approach to prudential management can plausibly be characterised as having a 
stronger emphasis on signaling when compared to similar advanced economies and that this has 
been complemented by an institutional regulatory approach. There seems to be an acceptance by 
Australian authorities that there are limits to what regulation can achieve.  
Based on Australia’s relative economic stability the signaling-regulatory mix appears to have 
been effective in managing aggregate risk. This suggests a major challenge for prudential 
                                                          
7
 http://www.rba.gov.au/speeches/2010/sp-ag-300310.html  Accessed 21st October 2014 
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authorities is to maintain the integrity of the signal.  Further, that any temptation to (over) 
regulate activity is resisted in the interest of promoting an efficient financial market. 
 
The Policy Context 
There is no global consensus as to whether policy settings should be supportive of financial 
innovation (as they generally are for technological innovation) or inhibitory to it (as they 
generally are in environmental regulation). This policy uncertainty can be attributed to two 
factors.  One is the difference between a real and a monetary economy and the associated 
difficulty of translating the effects of innovation in the finance sector to the real economy (where 
welfare gains accrue).  The second reason is the different way in which innovation happens in 
finance compared to other sectors. Commonly, innovation in the financial sector occurs as 
exogenous constraints are relaxed, whether this is due to technological or regulatory change.  
Merton Miller8 in reflecting on a period of unprecedented “innovation” in financial products in 
the 20 years to the mid-1980’s, states that: 
 
“Many of the financial innovations…already existed in one form or another for many 
years before they sprang into prominence. They were lying like seeds beneath the snow, 
waiting for some change in the environment to bring them to life.”     
 
In the past, changes in regulation has been motivated by goals of maintaining economic stability 
and maximising wealth.  Gerardi et al (2010) argue that one of the most significant reasons for 
deregulating the (US) mortgage market was to cope with the challenges of high inflation.  They 
suggest the resulting innovations served the industry well during the 1980s through to 2005.  
They further argue that the 2007 crash was not so much a result of the mortgage market 
innovations but rather that lending institutions were poorly prepared for collapsing house prices.   
Interestingly, research focusing on the US and European markets concludes that market 
efficiency has been enhanced as a result of the recent deregulatory phase and ensuing product 
innovation of the markets (Gerardi et al (2010) and Scanlon et al (2008)).  Scanlon et al (2008) 
further observed that whilst liberalization has been an international phenomenon, this does not 
mean the markets are necessarily converging, rather they appear to be evolving in parallel, 
governed by different region-specific legislative frameworks.   
 
(De)regulation and Innovation  
It is commonly accepted that the 1980s was the beginning of a major phase of financial 
deregulation in Australia. This deregulatory phase continued many years lasting well into the 
1990s.  It began with the floating of the exchange rate in 1983.  In the same year it was 
                                                          
8
 Miller (1986) 
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announced that ten banks would be allowed to enter into the market (domestic and foreign 
owned).  In the years that immediately followed there was much deregulation including the 
removal of all remaining controls of bank deposits and interest rate ceilings for owner-occupier 
loans (Williams 2009).  A more comprehensive list of regulatory changes is presented in de Silva 
et al (2015). 
It was not until the 1990s that competition really started to increase in the home mortgage 
market.  This was typified by the beginning of the Commonwealth Bank privatisation in 1991 
followed by the appearance of the first home loan originator Aussie Home Loans in 1992. By the 
end of 1990s the market had matured to be a highly competitive and innovative sector (Williams 
2009).   
To explore the (de)regulation–innovation nexus, it is necessary to have an historical account of 
both regulatory and innovation changes in the mortgage market.  Prior to this research, no such 
account existed. This represented a significant challenge. Our solution was two-fold: 
1. Gather as much information from secondary sources as possible. 
2. Interview mortgage industry representatives from the wholesale and retail sectors and 
from industry bodies.  
For the first part we scoured media releases from Australian central authorities, focusing mainly 
on the RBA and APRA reports, senate enquiries and the like.  A richer form of information, 
however, was gathered from our interviews.  We conducted semi-structured interviews until a 
broadly consistent picture emerged. In aggregate our interviewees had over 100 years of 
mortgage industry experience spanning both the retail and wholesale markets  
The main innovations identified were: (1) high loan to value mortgages; (2) mortgage brokers; 
and (3) securitisation.  Interestingly, tweaks to mortgage products including interest only and 
low/no doc loans did not seem to feature heavily in the interviews.   
We were intrigued to discover that the majority of these “product” innovations appeared well 
before the beginning of the deregulatory phase.  For example, one interviewee reported that the 
first loans to be offered with less than 25 percent deposit occurred as early as 1965.  Further, the 
mortgage broking industry first appears in 1972 – although there is some dispute as to whether it 
first appeared in NSW or WA.  Similarly, the first mortgage-backed security emerged in 1979, 
and in its initial stage it was purely a non-bank product.   These accounts suggest that these 
innovations in the Australian market occurred prior to major episodes of deregulation 
(supporting Miller’s observation quoted earlier). Importantly, although the changes may have 
occurred prior to the major phase of deregulation, there is evidence that the two are not 
independent.  Specifically, one interviewee recounted how they had personally advocated 
changes in legislation to permit innovative products to become viable.   
Obviously there were many other minor innovations identified in our investigation, and which 
occurred throughout the 1980s and 1990s, that we have not explicitly discussed here.  A more 
comprehensive review of these innovations is presented in (de Silva et al, 2015).  Importantly, 
we observe that these innovations emerged at the time when the mortgage lending sector was 
experiencing intense levels of competition. 
We can summarise our analysis of how mortgage product innovations emerge as follows: 
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• They were often introduced by fringe market operators (typically non-banks).  
• At least three major innovations (LTV changes, Mortgage Broking and Secruitisation) 
predate the major (1980s) deregulation phase.   
• The number of product innovations multiplied dramatically in the 2000s 
• The period of early- to mid-2000s represents a time of heightened competition resulting 
from the initial changes of the deregulation phase.   
• The impact of many of the early innovations did not reach their peak until the 2000s.   
This summary suggests that the (de)regulation–innovation nexus is best described as inter-
dependent.  Further, that while deregulation may be a necessary condition of innovation, 
consumer accessibility to innovative products increases with competition.   
Conclusion 
The Australian policy/regulatory environment has a strong signaling component.  The extent to 
which this instrument remains effective therefore depends on the clarity and the importance that 
market participants place on the signal. 
We briefly reviewed the policy context, reporting that previous studies have concluded that 
market efficiency has improved as a result of this deregulatory phase. Interestingly, it was also 
reported that although markets have been evolving globally they have not been necessarily 
converging.   
The Australian experience of the innovation–regulation  nexus is that major mortgage 
innovations largely predated the deregulatory phase that begun in 1980s, and furthermore that 
innovation often occurred in the fringes of the markets.  Yet (de)regulation and innovation are 
indeed linked, as we also observed that these innovative products only became available to the 
general consumer when competition increased as a result of deregulation. 
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